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Paradigmatic or Critical? Resilience as a New Turn in EU governance for 
the Neighbourhood  
Elena Korosteleva 
Abstract 
Rising from the margins of EU aid documents, resilience became a centrepiece of the 2016 EU 
Global Security Strategy, especially in relation to the neighbourhood. While new resilience-thinking 
may signify another paradigmatic shift in EU modus operandi, the question that emerges is whether 
it is critical enough to render EU governance a new turn, to make it sustainable? This article argues 
that in order for resilience-framed governance to become more effective, the EU needs not just 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ?ďǇǁĂǇŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇĞŶĂďůŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?DŽƌĞĐƌƵĐŝally, the 
EU needs to understand resilience for what it is  ? a self-governing project  W ƚŽĂůůŽǁ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ?ĂŶ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽŐƌŽǁƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ůŝĨĞ ? ?/ƐƚŚĞhƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŶĞǁƚŚŝŶking, and not just rhetorically or even methodologically when 
creating new instruments and subjectivities? The bigger question is whether the EU is prepared to 
critically turn the corner of its neoliberal agenda to accommodate emergent collective rationalities 
of self-governance as a key to make its peace-building project more successful.   
Key words: European Union, resilience-thinking, governance, self-governance, eastern 
neighbourhood   
From governance by prescription to governance through resilience? 
In June 2016 Federica Mogherini, the Higher Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 
the Vice-President of the European Commission, announced ĂŶĞǁǀŝƐŝŽŶ ĨŽƌƚŚĞh ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
Strategy (EEAS). It was launched in the aftermath of the UK ?Ɛ Brexit referendum, and in the midst of rising 
extreme-right populism across Europe, a continuing influx of refugees, and the unfolding humanitarian 
disasters across the neighbourhood. Against this gloomy backdrop, comes a new vision for the European 
Union ?Ɛ (EU) global action, reciting resilience no less than 41 times especially in application to the 
neighbourhood (Juncos 2016: 3). As a concept, it rose from the obscurity of EU and ŐůŽďĂůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? aid and 
development documents to become a new organising principle for EU external relations. For the first 
time,  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?, officially ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐƚŽƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ƚŚƵƐǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĨƌŽŵŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĐƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?EEAS 2016:23), was made a centrepiece, ĂŶĚĂ ‘ůĞŝƚŵŽƚŝĨ ?
(Wagner and Anholt 2016) of the EU Global Security Strategy (EUGSS). What does the EU hope to achieve 
by moving resilience to the centre-stage of its external governance strategy, especially in relation to the 
neighbourhood? 
To date, the EU has undergone a series of reflective shifts to make its external governance more effective 
and sustainable. At the time of their issuance they were seen as profoundly paradigmatic beginning with 
the articulation of its proximity strategy (2003/4), its regionalisation strategy (2008/9), a differentiation 
strategy (2011) and lately, an association strategy (2014+) vis-à-vis the wider neighbourhood (Korosteleva 
2018; Henökl 2018). And yet, while innovative in their outlook and methodologies, those shifts were not 
critical enough to foster traction and rejuvenate a failing, in Commission ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ǁŽƌĚƐ (2015a), 
neighbourhood policy. ǇŵĂŬŝŶŐƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŝƚƐ'ůŽďĂů^ ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?Ɛ ‘ůĞŝƚŵŽƚŝĨ ? ?tĂŐŶĞƌĂŶĚŶŚŽůƚ ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ
EU aims to up its stakes in the neighbourhood once more, by way of making it, firstly, more interest-
driven and pragmatic; and secondly, more responsive, and adaptable to partners ?ŶĞĞĚƐ to enable them 
to cope better with challenges ŽĨŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇĂŶĚ ‘Ɖredictable unpredictability ? (EEAS 2016: 46). 
It also promises ŵŽƌĞ ‘ůŽĐĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?, insisting that  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĐhange can only be home-ŐƌŽǁŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ:27), 
ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ ‘bottom-ƵƉ ? engagement,  ‘ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐĂůůŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ).
While some of these priorities may already sound familiar, resilience as a strategy, as some scholars would 
argue, may indeed offer some innovative solutions to what seems to be a perpetual crisis of EU neo-liberal 




governance, essentially driven by the EU-centric vision of the world,1 especially in the neighbourhood. In 
particular, Wagner and Anholt insist that ?ŽǁŝŶŐƚŽŝƚƐ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ? ?resilience may be just that 
 ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŵŝĚĚůĞŐƌŽƵŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽǀĞƌ-ambitious liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective 
of ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?  ?2016:417). Whereas, decentring and the emphasis on local ownership, as Fisher Onar & 
Nicolaidis (2013) contend, ŵĂǇƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶaůŝƐƚŚƵďƌŝƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵǇŽƉŝĂ ?, which 
EU institutions were recently charged with, when projecting external governance (Lavenex 2016). 
Yet, on the other hand, resilience is too often associated with the same parochial reproduction of the 
neo-liberal agenda, which, according to Corry (2014: 270),  ‘ĚĞƉƌŝǀĞƐƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?and invariably, would lead to resistance, as resilient ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?response to the 
 ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ?ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐ ? ?Bourbeau and Ryan 2017:2).  
So, what should this  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ-ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?be as a new EU governance regime, in order to critically turn the 
corner, and to offer more sustainable solutions to the EU external peace-building project? Could the focus 
ŽŶ  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ? ŝŶĚĞĞĚŐŝǀĞEU governance a new momentum owing to its ability to learn from failure 
(Chandler and Coaffee 2017) to cope better and differently in the face of adversary? Would defining and 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďĞĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?KƌƐŚŽƵůĚǁĞfocus 
more on the hitherto understudied meaning of  ‘self-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐ
to reconcile neo-liberal governance with the emergent self-governing collective subjectivities? How can 
resilience as a governing strategy  W both conceptually and methodologically  W become not just 
paradigmatic, but distinctly critical to offer a new turn in (EU) governance studies?  
Although  ‘resilience ? as a concept is not new; in practical terms, it still constitutes a relatively unchartered 
terrain, especially when it comes to  ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?. It will doubtless involve some methodological 
pioneering on the part of the EU, which at the same time, will be complicated by its own delimitations of 
the term: while innovative in script, they often fall short of allowing EU governance to devolve and be 
creative.2 Furthermore, it becomes doubly problematic when situated in the context of a largely confused 
resilience scholarship, which paradoxically, problematizes more the process of (liberal)  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?
rather than that of  ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ? ?or how to nurture its  ‘ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ ?ƚŽďĞresilient. The overarching 
problem is that ǀĞƌǇĨĞǁƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚŽĚĂƚĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?, have a full comprehension of what 
state or societal resilience is all about, and how we can and should work with it, including this author. If 
resilience is truly about empowerŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ? ? ĂŶĚ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ existing and yet critical capacities 
(Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011), to enable change would require a far more radical de-centring 
conceptually, from those who govern to those who are subjectivised by it, and not by way of creating 
compliant (liberal) subjects as Joseph argues (2016), but ƌĂƚŚĞƌďǇǁĂǇŽĨĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐ  ‘ƉeoƉůĞŚŽŽĚƐ ?
(Sadiki 2016). Furthermore, ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŵƵůƚŝƉůĞŐĞŶĞĂůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚits ontological learning (Bourbeau 2018) 
suggest that it may not at all be about its conceptual and methodological defining. Neither is it entirely 
about responsibilising and devolving the reigns of governance to new subjectivities, within and outside 
the EU, who are still anchored to the EU scripts of governing rules and performance evaluation (Kurki 
2011). /ƚŵĂǇŶŽƚĞǀĞŶďĞĂďŽƵƚ  ‘governing through ? ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ  ‘governing over ? ƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐĞĚĂŶĚ
enabled new circuits of power, as Chandler argues (2014), for it would still be heavily reliant on the initial, 
though now distant centres of power to shape and direction the outside. This is where the true puzzle of 
resilience comes into stark contrast to our own external (neoliberal) governance thinking, which even at 
a distance, in the form of governmentality, still involves EU norms transference and alignment. 
                                                          
1 For more discussion on neo-liberal governance and its vulnerabilities see Reid, J. and Chandler, D. (2016) The 
Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability. London: Rowman and Littlefield.   
2 This is particularly instructive, as section 2 of this article demonstrates when ĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞh PǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶůŽĐĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞh ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?ƚŚĞ
former is delimited to approving the EU vision for transformation and change, rather than developing a truly 
autonomous and more sustainable local governance. 




Taking resilience seriously, as this paper contends, implicates a number of rational possibilities. 
Ontologically, there should not necessarily be one reading of resilience that would aim to ŽĨĨĞƌĂ ‘ŽŶĞ-fit-
Ăůů ?ǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐŐĞŶĞĂůŽŐǇĂŶĚits future foresight: resilience may have multiple meanings (Bourbeau 2018; 
Reid and Chandler 2016), which should be engaged with, to offer resilience a chance to realise its rich 
potential, extending beyond the current neo-liberal settings.  
Furthermore, methodologically, resilience ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇŝŵƉůǇĂƐŚŝĨƚŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽŶƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
and communities ?, as Joseph would argue (2016:389). Rather, it should be about understanding  ‘ƚŚĞ
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌwhat they are  W even if they emerge as opposing collective agencies (Corry 2014)  W to enable 
them to turn their existing capacities into critical infrastructures to necessitate change, from within, and 
make it sustainable. This, however, is different from identifying solutions from a list of prescriptive and 
reflective measures, or only investing in  ‘like-minded ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? and  ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
EUGSS suggests (EEAS 2016: 8;10).  
Most importantly, conceptually, resilience requires a radical rethink  W and not as an externalising 
governing strategy, but more so, in terms of its actual value  W ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ?, self-organising practice of 
collective agency in search fŽƌĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ ? ?It should involve re-discovering ŽĨ ‘self-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? 
 W and not necessarily ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐ ?  ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ? ŐŽŝŶŐ ďĞǇ ŶĚ
governmentality, to conceive of a gently guided self-organisation predicated on a ĚĞĞƉ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞŚŽŽĚ ? ?^ĂĚŝŬŝ ? ? ? ? ) ?community ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŐĂĐŝƌŽ ? W the meaning of good life (Rutazibwa 2014), which 
are distinctly different from externalised governance. Perhaps, as Schmidt (2015) contends, it really needs 
a leap to imagine a post-neo-liberal world, of coordinated self-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĚŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞŚŽŵĞ-grown 
ůŽĐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ? ?/ƐƚŚĞhƌĞĂĚǇƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞƚŚŝƐůĞĂƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚůĞƐƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĂďůĞ
tomorrow, even if its current resilience-infused discourse points in that direction?      
This paper sets to unpack these and other questions about, first, resilience as a governance strategy, to 
see what current limitations of ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďǇƚŚĞh(section 2) and how they could be overcome 
to enable the EU to critically turn the corner, for more sustainable relations with the outside  W 
ontologically, methodologically and conceptually (section 3). What this paper will not do is to claim to 
offer definitive answers: instead it intends to problematize resilience as a theory of self-governance, 
which would hopefully make future discussions more purposeful, especially when it comes to reconciling 
external and self-governing projects. In what follows next, the first section will explore the genealogy of 
resilience and its ontological meanings to establish what is still potentially  ‘ƵŶƐĂŝĚ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞconcept, 
and its delimitations. In the second section, resilience will be examined methodologically, in terms of how 
the EU sees its application to practice. This will be situated in the context of the h ?Ɛprevious 
paradigmatic shifts vis-à-vis the neighbourhood, to help understand where its true potential may be. 
Finally, conceptually, the paper will seek to explore ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉůĂĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞŚŽŽĚ ?in the context of new resilience-thinking, to see if EU governance could critically turn the 
corner, towards more sustainable governing regime of the outside.   
ǯmany ontological meanings: problematising the unsaid  
It is paradoxical that for a concept that has been in use by different strands of natural, environmental, 
social and political sciences, there is still little known about how it really works, and how and whether we 
ought to extend its utility from an individual to the level of states and societies, as part of the governance 
ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ƐŽƵƌďĞĂƵĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐǀĞƌǇůŝƚƚůĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĂƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ? dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ŝƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ďƵƚ ƌĂƌĞůǇ ƵŶƉĂĐŬĞĚ ? ůĞƚ ĂůŽŶĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ ? ?
Resilience, as a concept, cuts across many disciplines  W from ecology, psychology, computer sciences, to 
organisational and management studies, and now political studies and international relations  W and 
noticeably, has relevance for many, conveying a strong narrative of the Self  W individual and collective  W 
in their struggle for survival, self-esteem and self-reliance. As Bourbeau contends further ? ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŚĂƐ
ďĞĞŶ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?  ?/ďŝĚ P ? ) ?ŶĚǇĞƚ ?there is still 
much unsaid about it, making it a potentially contentious concept for practical use, let alone as a 




 ‘ůĞŝƚŵŽƚŝĨ ?ŽĨh'ůŽďĂů^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?tĂŐŶĞƌĂŶĚŶŚŽůƚ ? ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁŝƐŝƚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚĂƌĞŝƚƐŐĞŶĞĂůŽŐŝĐĂů
pathways, and should we strive to bring multiple definitions to a common denominator?  
In his insightful article (2018), Bourbeau makes a strong and convincing claim against a single genealogy 
of resilience, believing that its pathways should be more inclusive, non-linear and not restrictive to any 
ideological context. Instructively, in response to a strong statement by Walker and Cooper (2011:144, in 
ŽƵƌďĞĂƵ P ? ) ?ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶĐŽůŽŶŝǌŝŶŐŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂƌĞŶĂƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝƐ
due to its intuitive ideological fit with a neŽůŝďĞƌĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?ŽƵƌďĞĂƵ
purports that this singular interpretation is potentially detrimental to the conceptual richness and 
practical usefulness of the concept itself, especially in the context of governance. He urges to adopt a 
multiple genealogy of the term, which would have several important implications. First, it would open up 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĚĞďĂƚĞƐŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ? ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ? ůŝŵŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?ŽĨ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƚŽ ǁŽƌůĚ
governance, which is currently amiss. Second, it would also, while acknowledging the validity of 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚƉƵƚ ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŝŶƚŽ  ‘ĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌĂŶĚ ƌŝĐŚĞƌ
context so that the literature does not develop on the assumption that resilience is only a by-product of 
ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?  ? ? ? ?8:15). Finally, it would permit the emergence of  ‘analytical frameworks capable of 
incorporating the multiple and multifaceted expressions of ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶŽƵƌ ? ?ƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?/ďŝĚ ) ? 
Taking Bourbeau ?Ɛ argument as an important departure point, this paper would insist on retaining 
resilience ?Ɛ multiple meanings  W ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽƉǇŝŶŐ ? ‘ďŽƵŶĐŝŶŐďĂĐŬ ? ?ƚŽ ‘bending but not 
ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? in the face of adversary  W precisely for the purpose of inviting further discussion of its properties, 
positive and negative, to fully understand how the inner dynamics of the Self work for the purpose of 
survival and transformation. In the conceptual section, this paper would condense the multiple meanings 
of resilience to the notion of self-organisation of individuals to become part of a collective and sustainable 
agency, both domestically and externally, precisely to consider strategies for transformation in the 
context of external governance.  
To continue in relation to its multiple meanings, resilience as it happens, is not at all uncontroversial or 
uniformly conducive to producing compliant subjectivities in the process of externalising ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
governance.  
ůĂƌŐĞƐƚƌĂŶĚŽĨƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐŚƵŵĂŶ ‘adaptability ? Was the ability to bounce back  W as a defining 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?dŚŝƐŐŽĞƐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞ>ĂƚŝŶŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝƌĞ ? ? ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽ
adjust easily to misfortune, adversity, unease, ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?ĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?ŽƵƌďĞĂƵ ? ? ? ?). In social terms 
(Fleming and Ledogar 2008), this however, also implicates human ability to adapt to various regimes of 
governance (including of disciplining nature), in a struggle to survive and achieve stability. Under these 
headings many regimes in the neighbourhood, could be argued, exemplify an envious degree of resilience 
 W Syria or Iraq are perhaps the most extreme cases here  W in which individuals display a remarkable ability 
to adapt to the direst circumstances of watching their lives destroyed and yet staying put to survive. Less 
obvious and yet rather striking examples of adaptability include many post-communist regimes in the 
eastern region, where public appreciation of stability associated with political predictability, controlled 
environment and basic satisfaction of human needs, runs counter to the western claims for democracy, 
contestation and freedom. In these countries (e.g. Belarus is a case in point), the most oft-cited reference 
ŝƐ ‘ĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĂƌ ? ?ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŚĂĚĞŶĚƵƌĞĚŚĂƌĚship and atrocities in previous wars and pass 
this legacy to future generations, become almost resistant to change, and negatively resilient in the face 
of any power deformation or rupture, naturally valuing stability and strong rule over the uncertainty of 
democratic governance. This complex social adaptability keeps many authoritarian regimes3 alive and 
                                                          
3 Discussion of resilience in the context of authoritarian or non-democratic regimes is particularly important, 
because resilience, as a theory of self-governance, is focused on capacity-building of the existing critical 
infrastructures. Their identification and differentiation from the structures that support and reproduce non-
democratic regimes would be critical for societal and state resilience-building. This discussion however goes beyond 
the scope of this article, and will be developed elsewhere. 




functioning, simply because people have adapted their ways to survive the punitive nature of these 
regimes, and given their predictability, even to use reŐŝŵĞƐ ? ŝŶŶĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ  ?ŚĞŶĐĞ
corruption is so ingrained in the region as a paradoxical manifestation of societal resilience).  
Ability to adapt and survive under whatever circumstances also breeds undesirability of change, and 
conformity ?ƐŽƵƌďĞĂƵĂƉƚůǇƉƵƚƐŝƚ P ‘ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĂů ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ůŝĨĞ ?ĞŝŶŐƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚŵĞĂŶďĞŝŶŐĂŶŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƚŽƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?
(2013:8). Conformity, on the other hand, reinforces the existing order of things, effectively censoring 
ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ŝŶ ůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂů ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌŵƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ůĞĂĚƐ ƚŽ
normation  ? observance of the prevalent norms, making existing regimes endue. For Zebrowski, 
conformity with social norms is the only norm that stands during disasters: in the face of adversary, they 
ĂƌĞ  ‘ĨĂƌ ĨƌŽŵ ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŝůů  ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ŐŽǀĞƌŶ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ǁŚĞŶ Ăůů ŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝĨƐ ? ŽĨ
governance fail. Conformity, or adherence to the established norms, requires careful political 
ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐŝŶĨĞƌƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝƐ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ
ĐĂƵƐĞ ?ŽĨĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůŝďĞƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
reifying resilience as an object of governance, rather a given. Zebrowski contends that for conformity to 
ŽĐĐƵƌ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŽ ĞŵĞƌŐĞ ?  ‘Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĞŶĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ĨŽƌŐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ
through the repeated exercise of governmental praĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ? ) ? /ŶƐƚŝůůŝŶŐĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ŝŶ
populations reduces the need for direct governance, thus leading to a form of neoliberal governmentality 
of managing the conduct of conduct, from a distance (Foucault 2007). He exemplified its utility on the 
ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĂŶŝĐ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐ ? ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  Wthose who display 
conformity with prevalent social norms  W tend to recover quicker in the face of adversary, for they strongly 
rely on  ‘ƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞ ? when given sufficient information for action.  
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ŐŽŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?, as Chandler (2015) 
originally insisted, by way of removing institutional obstacles to ensure recovery. Crucially, it is about 
understanding the intricacies and implications of unleashing other properties of resilience - adaptability, 
conformity and undesirability of change. Resilience governance, when applied to social interactions on 
the level of states, opens up the whole Pandora box of difficult issues pertaining to power and self-
governance. Biermann et al. for example, observe that resilience is often criticised for being apolitical and 
ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐŝŶŐ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƋƵŽ ? ? KƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵĂŝŶ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ
relĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂůƐŽƉƌŽǀŽŬĞƐ  ‘ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŽĨwhat and for whom ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁŚĞŶ
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞŽŶĞ ? ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ‘ĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽ
failure to recognise issues of power, justice, and ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŝŶ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐŝŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞŝŶŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ‘ŵĂǇĞǀĞŶĂůůŽǁŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐ
ǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƚŽďĞĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚĞĚ ? ?/ďŝĚ )ƚŚƵƐĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚůǇĞŵďĞĚĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
asymmetry of power in the subject-object relations with a recipient. This certainly raises some 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƚŽ ‘what needs to be kept resilient, to what and for whom ? ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ) ?
ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ  ‘ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů Ɛubjectivities, radical change or alternative 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŵŽĚĞƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? )ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĂŵŝƐƐŽƌŶŽƚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇƐƉŽŬĞŶŽĨŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶĂ ‘ŚŝŐŚůǇƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐĞĚĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ?ŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨĞǆĞĐƵting 
ůŝďĞƌĂů ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ  ‘ŬŶŽǁŶ ŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?  ?ŝĞƌŵĂŶŶ ĞƚĂů  ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ, as our study of EU 
governance regime in the next section will expose. 
In a similar vein, under resilience governance, as Mavelli argues (2016), power hierarchies are particularly 
ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŽĨƚĞŶƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝƐŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽďĞĂ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ?dŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĞǀĞŶďĞƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŽ
punish those who, through descent, come to challenge the status quo. Mavelli pungently demonstrated 
ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĚĂƌŬƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞhďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?,ĞĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
if anything, EU disciplinary governance caused a flip-ŽǀĞƌĞĨĨĞĐƚďǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬƐŵŽƌĞƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ?
when going through the bailout process; and the Europeans  W  ‘ůĞƐƐ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ?ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ďŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ƐŚĞůƚĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶďĂŶŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?ƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐ




the exposure of the centrality of neoliberal power and its hegemony (by the most powerful European 
states and Germany in particular), which instead of protecting all parties from the economic shock of the 
'ƌĞĞŬĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ĐŚŽƐĞ ƚŽƉƵŶŝƐŚ ƚŚĞǁĞĂŬĞƐƚďǇ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐŽŶƚŽ ůĞƐƐǁĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ
 ‘ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ďŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƌĂĐŝƐŵ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ŽĨ ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ) ? 
dŚŝƐ ďƌŝŶŐƐ ƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ  ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶ ? ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ  W compliance as a 
counterintuitive effect of building resilience and individual self-reliance, in a neo-liberal context. Notably, 
Joseph argues (2013:45) that while putting an emphasis on the individual by way of micro-focusing on 
 ‘ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ? ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĐŽƚ Ŷƚŝously does not seek to empower autonomy, 
ĂŶĚĐŽŵĞƐĂƚŽĚĚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚŐŽĂůŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚĂůƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?EŽƚĂďůǇ ?
:ŽƐĞƉŚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨ
the individual ŝƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?He insists that , in a neo-liberal tradition,  ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ
ŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞǆĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ ) ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?from 
this perspective, is not and has never been, about empowering an individual, or a societal ability to 
bounce back in the face of complexity, but rather about constructing power dependencies to render 
 ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂů ? ĂŶĚ ůŽĐŬĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ Ă ĐǇĐůĞ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ (re)production in the form of 
coordinĂƚĞĚ  ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?In this vein ? :ŽƐĞƉŚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ? ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ  ‘ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
more effective in securing compliance to international norms, forcing states and local populations to 
adapt their behaviour in the face of problems that the international community either cannot, or does 
ŶŽƚ ? ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?According to this (neo-liberal) thinking, eŶŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ  ‘ƐĞůĨ-
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚresilience is an illusion, or an ideal, which realisation is as undesirable as an 
investŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌ ?/Ŷ short, not only are self-governance and 
autonomy treated as needed to lock subjectivities into a continuing mode of social power re-production; 
they also come in stuck contradiction with, and even denial of the very notion of active opposing agency 
(Corry 2014) ĂŶĚ ‘ƐĞůĨ-organisation ?ĂƐĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ for the sustainability of the liberal internationalist world 
order.  
To conclude, we ought to keep, at least for now, the many meanings of resilience open for discussion, in 
order to fully understand its conceptual and methodological delimitations, to free it from any ideological 
bias, and to search for more cooperative and sustainable forms of governance, if self-governance were to 
become the premise of a new order. The next section will examine how resilience is being understood by 
the EU, and what methodologies are being deployed to make EU governance more effective.  
The Methodological Underpinnings of Resilience in EU Governance  
For a relatively new concept,  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŵĂĚĞƋƵŝƚĞĂn impact in EU governance-thinking.  
Resilience firmly entered the EU agenda in 2012, being part of the EU re-thinking its humanitarian and 
development policies (Commission 2012). It was borrowed from ecological/environmental studies to help 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ‘ŚŽǁƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĐĂŶĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚ ?ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĨƌŽŵ ?ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?ŽƵƌďĞĂƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?At the time 
resilience began to be seen not just simply as a response to coping with disasters (especially of 
humanitarian nature), but also as a long-term systemic solution  ‘to tackle the root causes ? of these crises, 
as part of a new development agenda. In governance terms, it allowed the EU to intervene and coordinate 
external humanitarian/development agendas, to offer solutions which then could be simply  ‘ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ
ŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ) ?This thinking gradually allowed the EU to develop the so called 
 ‘resilience paradigm ?inclusive of ƚŚĞhĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽŽĨ ‘know-how ?technologies, good practice 
initiatives (e.g. SHARE; AGIR in Commission 2012) and methodologies of monitoring and evaluation. 
ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂƚĞƌŵǁĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂŶ ?ĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ƚŽǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚ ?ƚŽĂĚĂƉƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƋƵŝĐŬůǇƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ
ĨƌŽŵ ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ? (Ibid: 5). Most crucially, it relied on two specific dimensions: one was the 
 ‘ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨĂŶĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌƌĞƐŝƐƚƐƚƌĞƐƐĂŶĚƐŚŽĐŬ ? ?ĂŶĚƚǁŽ, was ƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŝƐĞŶƚŝƚǇ
ƚŽďŽƵŶĐĞďĂĐŬƌĂƉŝĚůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ) ?The Commission argued that increasing resilience could 
ďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌďǇĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ŽƌďǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?ŽƌďŽƚŚ ? 




(Ibid). The EU firmly believed in its own ability to control, manage and where necessary prevent disasters 
from happening  W a type of governance regime, that Chandler (2014:50) would describe ĂƐ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚ ?Žƌ
 ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ?, which would operate through ƚŚĞ ‘known knowns ?drawing on Ă ‘linear and universal assumption 
of the progressive accumulation of ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨůĂǁƐĂŶĚƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ǁŚŝĐŚthen could be 
transferred and embedded into ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?development programmes.  
Importantly, the EU-coined resilience paradigm was predicated on three core operational principles, 
which continue to shape EU governance-thinking today. First, in light of its expanding knowledge and 
techniques, even with the increasing uncontrollability of the outside, the EU believes it is better 
positioned to advise states and individuals on best-fitting  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?Ănd a  ‘ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?
capacity needƐ ?to enhance their preparedness and adaptability, which would need to be embedded and 
strengthened at the local and national levels (Commission 2012: 9). Second, the EU strongly emphasises 
 ‘local ownership ? of these external technologies-turned-capabilities ?ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ and 
openness to a long process of resilience-building:  ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ĐĂŶ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ďƵŝůƚ ďŽƚƚŽŵ-ƵƉ ? ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ h ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ  ?Ă Ĩŝƌŵ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?
(Commission 2012: 11). Finally, the EU importantly insists on applying its own  ‘ƐŽƵŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? of 
monitoring and evaluation to improve response and future governance. Notably,  ‘ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?
ƚŚĞhǁŝůůƉƵƚŝŶƉůĂĐĞĂĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŵĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨŝƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?, to 
include EU-funded programmes, a common operational assessment prepared by experienced 
humanitarian and development actors; and  ‘/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ WůĂŶƐ ? ?  ‘ƐŽ ĂƐ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ‘ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?. Furthermore, the Commission shall  ‘review 
regularly the progress made on the resilience agenda, looking in particular at programming, 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ), to lock partners into the emergent circle of governance. In short, it 
is instructive to see how emblematically opposing the EU understanding of resilience  W as a packaged 
intervention inclusive of modular governing strategies, monitoring/evaluation methodologies and  ‘ůŽĐĂů
ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? deployed to legitimise this intervention  W is to the multiple meanings of resilience as a 
concept, which centres ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ? ? 
The next few years saw some further programming of the EU resilience principles into the wider areas of 
development/humanitarian policies, along with a parallel expansion of the  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŶĞǆƵƐ ?
(Ibid:5), which subsequently offered propitious grounds for extending resilience into the strategic security 
and foreign policy domains. In particular, in 2013 the Commission introduced an  ‘Action Plan for 
Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries ?, which, while underscoring ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ-owned and -ůĞĚ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ-ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?contributed to further testing and expansion of provisions 
for the EU resilience paradigm:  
-  ‘hƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐe approaches [should 
ďĞ ?ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚWůĂŶƐ ? ?dŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶƐƚŽďƵŝůĚƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇďŽĚǇŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌ
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?  ‘dŚĞ ĐƚŝŽŶ WůĂn recognises that the EU is already incorporating 
ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŽŵĂŶǇŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘hŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂǀĞƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂ
ĐŽƌĞƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? (Ibid) for the recipient countries 
-  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝƐƌequired by government and international 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?dŚĞhZŽĂĚŵĂƉƐŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĚŽƐŽĂƚĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇůĞǀĞů ?
(Ibid:5) 
-  ‘DĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŽŽůƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ?hƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?
involving the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Delegations, as well as all relevant stakeholders to 
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ?ďƵŝůĚƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞďĂƐĞĂŶĚůĞĂƌŶĨƌŽŵďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?(Ibid). 
-  ‘'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ will be prepared and 
ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚĨŽƌĂůůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ) ? 




These provisions subsequently culminated in the formulation of a logframe of management 
arrangements which allowed the EU to master its resilience-building approach, and make it transferrable. 
They included a template of implementation measures, comprising a set of actions, accompanying 
activities, time-frame, and anticipated outputs. In 2014 this resilience development strategy was further 
consolidated into Ă ‘ŽŵƉĞŶĚŝƵŵ ? ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?a)  Wa comprehensive 116 page-long good practice 
guide with case studies and planning tools to assist partners in developing a coherent agenda for their 
resilience objectives; and a  ‘ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ DĂƌŬĞƌ ?(Commission 2014b), offering a manual to partner 
countries as to how to build their resilience, with EU support. 
With gradual expansion of the  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŶĞǆƵƐ ? ?by 2015 resilience moved to the EU foreign 
policy domain, specifically focusing on the neighbourhood ?Ɛ:ƵŶĐŽƐĂĨĨŝƌŵƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǀŝƐĞĚEWƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
adopted at the end of 2015 was one of the first documents to introduce resilience-building as a foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŐŽĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?As before, the document effectively rehearsed the EU ?Ɛ resilience paradigm, setting 
out measures for the neighbourhood,  ‘ƚŽŽĨĨĞƌǁĂǇƐƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŝŶ
the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? (Commission 
2015b:2).  
By 2016, resilience made it into the EUGSS to define the EU modus operandi across the globe. This time, 
however, the resilience narrative has received a rather different framing: it became less assertive about 
ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞand control the outside, and instead it strongly emphasised the ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ
growing complexity and the need to become and make partners, better prepared for no longer 
controllable eventualities. In place of the familiar mantra of  ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŬŶŽǁŶƐ ? in how to better placate 
emergencies, new resilience-thinking chose to paint a picture of global  ‘ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?EEAS 2016:7) 
and  ‘ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? (Ibid: 46), shifting the focus on to  ‘ƚŚĞunknowns ? ?and how to learn to 
correct the gaps in knowledge where possible (Chandler 2014). Furthermore, in the ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞh'^^ ?
claim of the growing contestation of liberal order whereby  ‘ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ĞǀĞŶĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨŽƵƌhŶŝŽŶŝƐ
ďĞŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ), resilience, in the language of the EU, seems to have shifted, to firmly associate 
with protecting the neoliberal agenda and its subjects, thus becoming to be seen not just as a by-product 
of liberalism, but essentially its tool.  
So, what are the implications of this resilience-thinking as part of extending EU governance regime onto 
the neighbourhood? 
As said in the introduction, the EU has been reflective of its limited governance effect in the 
neighbourhood, trying to address the challenge via new or improved methodologies of engagement, 
described here as paradigmatic shifts. In particular, the first paradigmatic shift in EU external governance 
was linked to the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003/4, signifying a move away 
from the EU enlargement modus operandi to a partnership-building regime (Korosteleva 2012). While 
novel in rhetoric, in practice it continued to rely on a lighter version of the enlargement modality (Kelley 
2006), involving direct transference of the EU  ‘ŬŶŽǁ-ŚŽǁ ? (acquis communautaire) and conditionality. 
This approach was often aptly referred to as EU  ‘inside-ŽƵƚ ?external governance (Lavenex 2004) to 
underscore the prevalent at the time episteme of the governing process  W the EU rationality of  ‘ŬŶŽǁing 
the ŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?  ?ŚĂŶĚůĞƌ  ? ? ? ? )  W that is, having sufficient instrumental knowledge, progressively 
accumulated through the enlargement process in Europe, to effectively drive change in the 
neighbourhood. The prevalent operational features of this type of (liberal) governance regime, included: 
- a hierarchical mode of coordination favouring executive bias and bilateral communication with 
national governments   
- a binary way of inculcating EU normative practices:  ‘take-it ? Žƌ  ‘leave-it ? approach without 
accounting for regional socio-cultural differences, and  
- a prescriptive instrumental approach to reforms involving conditionality and, in case of non-
compliance, disciplinary actions (sanctions, naming-and-shaming and other means of 
economic/political statecraft). 




This type of regime, embodying EU disciplinary governance, had a limited effect on the neighbourhood, 
especially in terms of generating ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ůŽĐĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƌ ĨŽƌŵƐ. 
Conversely, it caused a discomforting sense of inferiority among the neighbours, their disenfranchisement 
with power asymmetry vis-à-vis the EU (Kelley 2006; Raik 2006; Wolczuk 2009). 
The second paradigmatic shift in EU governance took place in 2008/9 by introducing ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?Ɛ
regionalisation, resulting in the launch of two complementary umbrella initiatives  W the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) and the Eastern Partnership Initiatives (EaP) respectively. The EU innovated on a 
range of methodologies, endeavouring to recalibrate the meaning of  ‘ůŽĐĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?, and to give its 
approach more inclusivity and traction. A dual-track approach was introduced to diversify EU channels of 
engagement and to target other than government actors (subjectivities) to snowball reforms in the 
recipient countries. This tool paved the way to the rise of civil society as an influential agency for 
promoting change in the region.  
In 2011 this approach witnessed further innovations spanning from new forms of contractual agreements 
 W Association Agreements (AAs), Mobility partnerships and Deep Comprehensive Free Trade agreements 
(DCFTAs)  W to new means of monitoring and control  W from roadmaps, association agendas and logframes 
for key deliverables. The refined governance strategy also yielded new policy actors (subjectivities) 
engaging all levels of society from grass-root NGOs and local authorities to regional and national level 
government agents and businesses. This approach did not only consolidate the  ‘know-how ? of the EU 
governance framework to date, building on its progress and policy failure, it also brought together an 
incredible machinery of EU tools and instruments  W in a  ‘more for more ? formula  W aiming to ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
ůŽĐĂů ? ? ‘from a distance ? (as governmentality in a Foucauldian sense), in a less disciplinary, and a more 
bottom-up manner (Korosteleva 2014 et al). In summation, the main features of the new EU governance 
regime included: 
- control from a distance, and only of the pertinent, allowing for more local ownership, agenda-
input and tailored solutions; 
- a complex matrix of  “enablement ? premised on voluntary engagement and rational freedom of 
choice aiming to lock ENP countries in the perpetual mode of  ‘more for more cooperation ?; 
- engagement of all levels of society: from civil society, business and education actors, to 
local/regional authorities, national governments, parliaments, and media representatives, thus 
generating an all-inclusive grounds for mutual learning and socialisation into European norms and 
standards; 
-  ‘optimal (rather than binary) space ? between  ‘the permitted ? and  ‘the prohibited ?, allowing 
neighbours to approximate rather than fully replicate European norms and values, thus 
accounting for and preserving their  ‘cultural space ? as well; 
- development of a dual track of engagement: making the bilateral track more technocratic (e.g. 
roadmaps) and the multilateral track ŵŽƌĞ “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?to generate a sense of community and this 
way, re-engineer public behaviour in the neighbourhood.  
This regime of EU governance-thinking closely resonates with a  ‘ŶĞŽ-ůŝďĞƌĂů ? turn in governance, as the 
one that reflectively tries to identify gaps in knowledge and reasons for resistance  ?ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?), and methodologically tackle them via new instruments (budgets, subjectivities, new power 
circuits, formats of contractual relations, benchmarks, roadmaps etc.), to improve performance on 
deliverables. And yet, this revised governance strategy came to a grinding halt by 2014, and ensuing a 
drawn-out civil war in Ukraine, diplomatic impasse with Russia, and a highly unsettled environment for 
pursuing EU governance across the region.   
The above ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐƐŚŝĨƚƐŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŵŽĚĞŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
also vividly demonstrate the EU ?Ɛ struggle to find more traction for extending and legitimising its 
governance over the neighbourhood: neither the macro-level disciplinary governance nor a more tailored 
governmentality approach made it in any way more sustainable, let alone effective (Korosteleva et al 




2014). Could a new focus on resilience in 2016 help remedy the continued failings of EU governance - 
especially in terms of the EU ?Ɛbetter understanding of how to engage with a contested region, torn by 
civil war, claims for secession, corruption, government privatisation and envious autocratic stability? After 
all, if the utility of resilience, as Joseph argues (2016), is to help frame a suitable mode of governance 
learning from its own failures, then the question writ large here is ŝĨ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶŽƵŐŚ
narrative to make a difference, for a more effective and sustainable EU approach towards the 
neighbourhood.   
On the one hand, even the mere articulation of a more pragmatic policy approach, seems to have ensued 
a fledgling dialogue and negotiations with more recalcitrant partners, like Belarus and Azerbaijan, who 
hitherto had been subject to the EU sanctions (Belarus), or limited engagement (Azerbaijan). The EU has 
now successfully pioneered a new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with 
Armenia, which, while being committed to the Eurasian Economic Union, is still keen to continue pursuing 
a more tailored engagement with the EU (EEAS 2017).  
On the other hand, much depends on a new format that a resilience-premised governance is likely to 
take. If it does choose to de-centre, to invest more in a critical capacity-building at the individual/societal 
level, then it needs to fundamentally re-think its learning about the outside, predicated more on a better 
understanding of self-governance, and a potentially opposing communal agency (Corry 2014). At the 
same time, does the EU, and/or the wider scholarship know enough about ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂƐ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?
to make the right call this time, to ensure a better EU response to the external challenges, especially in 
the neighbourhood? So far, judging by the EU ?Ɛ proposed practical measures to build resilience in the 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?ĂƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘<ĞǇĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂďůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐa strong feeling, that 
the EU resilience paradigm will be rehearsed again to lock partners in to the EU hubristic mode of 
governance, as before, associated with embedding  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ? ĂŶĚlogframes for 
monitoring ĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽŶ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĐŽŵŝŶŐĐůŽƐĞĞŶŽƵŐŚ to allow autonomy 
and self-organisation.  
How should resilience be conceptualised to really help reset the EU governance approach to give external 
communities an opportunity to build their own existing capacities, and to empower their sustainable self-
organisation? So far, the EU ?Ɛ use of resilience tells us more of an EU story of what resilience building 
should be all about, and how it could be assessed and evaluated to improve performance. We need to 
understand resilience for what it is, and how it is connected ƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞůŽĐĂů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŚŽŽĚ ? ?before 
conceiving of how it could make EU external governance more sustainable for the outside. 
Conceptualising Ǯǯ: towards a new critical turn in 
governance 
For more cooperative and sustainable governance to occur, predicated on resilience-thinking, it would 
require, as Chandler contends (2014), embracing complexity in full, and with it, a recognition of the 
uncontrollability of the outside. This, however, is different to (neo)liberal thinking about complexity: 
Resilience-thinking instead requires a shift beyond instrumental governance operating ŝŶ Ă  ‘ǁŽƌůĚ
amenable to cause-and-effect understandings of policy-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ), and relatedly, a rejection of the 
two core tenets of the EU Transition Paradigm  W the management and assessment of resilience-building 
inside-out fomenting dependable subjectivities. This means moving beyond the certainties of (neo)liberal 
order, with its  ‘ŬŶŽǁŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ? rationalities of regulatory policies and interventionist practices. It also 
infers contesting a neo-liberal mode of governance which opens up to accepting complexity but still 
operates from a position ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŬŶŽǁŶ ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ? ? ƚŽbe ready to  ‘intervene 
instrumentally in the sphere of complex soĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ), on self-reflection, and to remove 
 ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůďůŽĐŬĂŐĞƐ ?ĂƐƵŶŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ) ?ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌŚĂŶĚůĞƌ ?ŝƐ
definitely a leap beyond neoliberalism, whereby ǌŽŽŵŝŶŐŽŶƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ? ?ĂƐŝƚŶaturally does ?ŝƐ ‘ŶŽƚ
about governing from the top-down or the bottom-ƵƉďƵƚĂďŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů
capacities of ordinary people. It is these capacities that are perceived to be bypassed or muted by 




instrumentalised ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?Chandler 2014:60). This type of governance 
infers working through, or more pertinently, with ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ P  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ
capabilities that already exist and could be encouraged (Ibid:61). It is simply about an ontological 
understanding of our natural abilities to cooperate with each other and construct communities of shared 
interest. /ŶƚŚŝƐƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞƌĞĨƌĂŵĞĚ ‘ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ
the creative and self-ŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌŽĨůŝĨĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?/ďŝĚ P ? ? ) ? 
This, however, constitutes a radical departure from an illusory sense of autonomy of the neo-liberal world 
for which resilience, as Joseph posits (2016), is to socially construct reliable subjectivities, to conduct 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛlives in their strife to survive and adapt in the face of adversity. This suggests that neoliberalism 
may have ĞǆŚĂƵƐƚĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨ P ‘ƚƵƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŽĂŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ?ŝƚ ?ƐĞĞŵƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƐĞůĨ-ĐŽŶƐƵŵŝŶŐ ?
(Schmidt 2015:414), and requires a pragmatic solution  W from decision-making to self-cultivation  W to 
allow resilience to achieve its true potential, which is no longer delimited by its  ‘ĚĂƌŬƐŝĚĞ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐ
compliance, conformity and undesirability of change. A pragmatic solution would seek to move beyond 
instrumental rationalities of neoliberalism, to imagine a self-organised collectivity, whose resilience is 
instead predicated on a growing sense of the self, its creative capabilities and critical infrastructures, to 
engender longevity and cooperative sustainability in a complex and uncontrollable environment.  
At the same time, how to make this leap, and with it, to render resilience a better/richer rationality for 
more effective governance framing, is still an open question. Some (Kaufmann 2013) might argue that 
ŶĞǁ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌŝĨĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĞůĨ-reliant and 
sustainable societies gently coordinated by a supportive inside-outside relationship. Others (Chandler 
2015; Korosteleva 2017) would say that the resilience potential for more effective governance lies with 
ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞǇĞƚƚŽĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨothering, where the 
self and the other are understood not in opposition and not even in juxtaposition to one another, but 
rather as a nexus of learning and self-development. This understanding is not necessarily to be attained 
via new knowledge and the expansion of our epistemological horizons, but rather ontologically  W through 
accepting other-ness as a way to relate the self to the outside in order to understand their life, needs and 
desires, and treating them as what they are, and want to be, rather than should be, in accordance to the 
ƐĞůĨ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? 
This new de-centred thinking can be captured by ĂĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ ? ?Žƌ ƚŚĞƌĂďŝĐƚĞƌŵ ‘Ăů-
ŚĂƌĂŬ ? ?ƌeferring, as Sadiki argues (2016 P ? ? ? )ƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŚŽŽĚ ?to encapsulate their vision for better 
ůŝĨĞ ?ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂƐ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ-ĚƌŝǀĞŶĨĞƌŵĞŶƚ ?. Rutazibwa (2014) takes it to a level further, by introducing and 
exploring the notion of  ‘ĂŐĂĐŝƌŽ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ[they] are the agents of 
[their] ŽǁŶĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ?4:5). In particular Rutazibwa argues that agaciro is a philosophy of life that draws 
on self-reliance and the inner knowledge of the people of what they are, and what they want to be, and 
could serve as a premise for resilience governance thinking. She contends further that  ‘agaciro ? stands for 
self-knowledge as foundation for self-governance: 
People know what is good for them. We must endeavour to show it. We must be seen to be doing 
things that prove that. So Agaciro is simply central to everything we are doing for our development, 
that pride, that belief in ourselves, that being who we are and who we should be, and trying to be 
the best we can be (2014:6) 
Agaciro, as the everyday and the local, relies on three essential elements: it is outward underscoring 
autonomy and sovereignty; it is inward legitimising expectations of a new social contract, and it is 
individual encapsulating a newly found self-worth identity linked to pride in the future that is being built 
today (Ibid:7). In many ways, it encapsulates the best side of resilience allowing people to define what 
they are and where they want to be, and travel to that destination, if necessary with the support of others. 
This kind of resilience does not generate conformity and compliance with the norms and rules of the 
external authority in the pursuit of their ideals; rather it encourages diversity and self-cultivation through 
cooperation. It does it through a particular type of othering that locks in the self and the other, in a 




reciprocal partnership-based learning that cannot be achieved through external strategy papers, progress 
reports and logframes to manage and evaluate ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? performance against external identified 
benchmarks, as neoliberal thinking would naturally assume. This kind of othering comes with a particular 
ontological type of learning that draws on a relational value of the self and the other in their connected 
development ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ  ‘ƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĞůĨis ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝƚƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ?ĚŬŝŶƐ
1999: 24), thus reversing the logic of governance onto itself. From this perspective, as Chandler argues 
(2014:57)  ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝƐ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ “ŶŽƚĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ďƵƚĂůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƚis governance 
failure, which is the failure to reflexively learn from complex life the need to overcome reductionist 
understĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
While this type of resilience thinking is profoundly relevant to the increasing complexity of the outside, it 
still requires more consideration of its practicalities  W of how to realise the resilience potential in practice. 
Can we rely on the everyday, the local and the peoplehood, to know exactly what their challenges are, 
and more importantly, how to overcome them, in becoming what they want to be  W in their agaciro?    
This is still an open-ended question. Intuitively, as Chandler points out (2015:38), resilience governance 
presumes a process of  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽƌƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƐĞůĨ-
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?how are we to build ƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĂů
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?and how different are they from the real-life communities which might endue daily 
hardship, and ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛnaked brutality, as the thwarted March for Freedom in Belarus on 25 March 2017 
attested to, and continue living through, for the sake of survival. How do we achieve the kind of resilience 
that would unlock critical infrastructures to nurture good governance from within? What kind of 
governance would it require to avoid the entrappings of compliance and dependency?    
Kauffmann (2013) suggests to place more emphasis on the study of self-organisation, as part of the wider 
network system of governance. She argues that self-organised communities, while relying on external 
support, ŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶŶĞƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ƚŚĂƚĨŽŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛ
reorganisation without recourse to the resources of the outside. This kind of governance might be best 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘guided self-ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƐŚĂƌĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐ ?
where the whole renders support to the local, and the local changes the whole through creative self-
organisational performance (Ibid:68). In this context, resilience of the peoplehood, as Chandler argues, 
 ‘ƌĞŵŽǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞƌ ĨƌŽŵ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŝƐ makes local capacities, 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŶĚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?14:48)  W in self-reliance and as 
part of the whole. 
Conclusion 
This article has critically explored the notion of resilience as the emergent EU governance regime. While 
still relatively new to the domain of international relations, resilience as a concept has already made quite 
a career, recently claiming its place in the EU global security strategy, in defining EU relations with the 
outside, and the EU neighbourhood in particular.  
Emerging from the EU humanitarian and development agendas, by the early 2010s resilience found its 
practical enframing in the so-called Resilience Paradigm, as aptly coined by the Commission. Its 
application was premised on the assemblage of three core governing principles, including (i) the 
knowledge of best-suited  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶing strategies ?  ? ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?Žƌ ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ? ); (ii  EU 
management and evaluation procedures for implementation and control; and (iii) a demand for local 
ownership, to ensure ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?commitment and endurance. By 2016 resilience took the centre-stage 
of the EU Global Security Strategy, especially in relations with the wider and very much troubled 
neighbourhood, seeking to inject new dynamics in the hitherto failing EU modus operandi for ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?
greater commitment and change. 




This paper has argued that in order to make resilience a tangible tool for enabling the EU to turn the 
corner for more effective and sustainable governance, we need to give it a far more careful consideration 
 W ontologically, methodologically and conceptually  ? than it is presently being afforded. 
In particular, ontologically, we should re-engage with the many meanings of resilience, to uncover and 
understand its multiple genealogies, in order to better grasp its inner and often controversial dynamics, 
and to give it a chance to realise its rich and yet understudied potential. This may mean even extending 
its etymology beyond the neo-liberal settings of governance fallaciously premised on  ‘ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶ ‘the unknoǁŶƐ ?when dealing with complexity.  
It also implies changing EU external governance approach, both methodologically and especially 
conceptually, to ensure it is not just simply about reproducing and enforcŝŶŐĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŝůůƵƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?, that makes it a necessary ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŵŝůŝĞƵ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
name of a liberal-internationalist peace-building project.  
Quite the opposite, as this article has argued: resilience, if taken seriously, requires an urgent rethink of 
its actual value  W namely, as a concept and practice ŽĨ ‘self-governance ? ?putting a self-organising principle 
ŽĨĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǀĂƌŝĂďůǇ )ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĂŐĞŶĐǇŝŶƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌŝƚƐŽǁŶƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ŐŽŽĚůŝĨĞ ? ?at the heart 
of their modus operandi. This would entail new ways of not just thinking about, but also invariably 
adapting  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůgovernance ? to the needs of self-governance, as enabling  ‘ƚŚĞpeoplehood ?, ĂŶĚ ‘the 
local ?, to make global governance more sustainable.  
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